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This study advances research on CEO-board 
relationships, interlocking directorates, and director 
reputation by examining how contests for 
intraorganizational power can affect interorganizational 
ties. We propose that powerful top managers seek to 
maintain their control by selecting and retaining board 
members with experience on other, passive boards and 
excluding individuals with experience on more active 
boards. We also propose that powerful boards similarly 
seek to maintain their control by favoring directors with 
a reputation for more actively monitoring management 
and avoiding directors with experience on passive 
boards. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally using 
CEO-board data taken from 491 of the largest U.S. 
corporations over a recent seven-year period. The 
findings suggest that variation in CEO-board power 
relationships across organizations has contributed to a 
segmentation of the corporate director network. We 
discuss how our perspective can reconcile contrary views 
and debates on whether increased board control has 
diffused across large U.S. corporations.' 
Have boards of directors of large U.S. corporations recently 
moved toward greater control of top managers? Recent 
discussions of corporate governance practices in the U.S. 
seem to vary widely in their answer to this question. For 
every research study or business press editorial pointing 
toward increasingly active boards, there appears to be a 
corresponding study or editorial arguing the opposite (Lorsch 
and Maciver, 1989; Davis, 1991; Fortune, 1993; Wall Street 
Journal, 1995a). The theoretical explanations used to support 
one or the other perspective range from a belief that public 
discourse and investor pressures have led to the diffusion of 
greater board independence across U.S. corporations 
(Useem, 1992; Wall Street Journal, 1995b) to the 
managerialist belief that managerial entrenchment and the 
cooptation of boards by powerful chief executive officers 
(CEOs) remain as strong as ever (Pfeffer, 1992; Wall Street 
Journal, 1995c). 
Rather than debate the relative merits of such sweeping and 
rather one-sided perspectives on corporate governance, we 
suggest instead that a theory is needed that can 
simultaneously explain the coexistence and persistence of 
both board-controlled and CEO-controlled firms. We develop 
and test a theory that can explain such variation, based on 
an analysis of director appointments, whereby powerful 
actors in the CEO-board relationship affect the diffusion of 
board independence through the selection and retention of 
directors whose prior directorship experiences suggest 
differential sympathy for their interests. For instance, we 
propose that more powerful CEOs will avoid director 
candidates who have participated as directors in increasing 
the level of board monitoring and control over CEOs on 
other boards, while favoring new director candidates with 
prior directorship experience in protecting or bolstering CEO 
control. 
With few exceptions (e.g., Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; 
Davis, 1993), much of the corporate governance literature 
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has taken board composition as a given, seeking to examine 
its implications rather than its determinants, but three 
distinct streams of research on boards could be invoked to 
examine the selection or retention of individual directors. 
One stream of research in organization behavior has typically 
examined the extent to which boards are a passive tool of 
management interests (Vance, 1968; Mace, 1971; Herman, 
1981). Typical for this line of inquiry is examining how 
specific dimensions of board structure (e.g., the proportion 
of outside directors or the separation of CEO and board 
chair roles) can affect relative power and decision-making 
tendencies in the CEO-board relationship and thus affect the 
allegiance of board members to management's or 
shareholders' interests (Kosnik, 1987; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1989; Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990; 
Mallette and Fowler, 1992). This line of research would 
suggest that the composition of boards will be determined 
largely by the attempts of powerful individual CEOs to coopt 
existing directors and influence the selection and retention 
of directors who are more likely to be sympathetic to that 
particular CEO's interests (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
A second stream of research draws largely from 
organizational sociology and is concerned with determining 
the macro-structure of boards, i.e., the network of 
interlocking directorates (Ornstein, 1980), and its 
implications, such as the diffusion of particular organizational 
practices. From this perspective, internal power and 
influence dynamics between CEOs and boards are less 
relevant than how interlocking directorates may reflect 
interorganizational dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Pennings, 1980; Zajac, 1988) or unity among members of 
the elite class (Koenig and Gogel, 1981; Mizruchi, 1982; 
Useem, 1982). Thus the best predictor of the specific 
composition of boards of directors is likely to reflect either 
interorganizational dependencies or social ties among 
members of the elite class. Empirical studies examining 
whether "broken" interlocks between resource- 
interdependent firms are reconstituted reflect an attempt to 
address such issues (Ornstein, 1980; Palmer, 1983; Palmer, 
Friedland, and Singh, 1986; Stearns and Mizruchi, 1986). 
A third perspective on corporate governance that can 
address the question of director appointments is grounded in 
the agency conception of corporate boards as a generally 
effective, if imperfect controf mechanism serving to protect 
shareholder interests (Fama, 1980). From this financial 
economics perspective, an efficient labor market for 
corporate directors acts as a motivating and disciplining 
device (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Directors seek to develop 
and maintain a favorable reputation as active representatives 
of shareholder welfare, thus enhancing their human capital 
on the boards on which they sit and increasing their 
attractiveness as candidates for board appointments at other 
firms. 
While each of these largely nonoverlapping streams of 
research contributes to some understanding of changing 
board appointments, considering both the intraorganizational 
and interorganizational dimensions of board membership 
together would provide additional insights. We develop such 
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Board Interlocks 
a theoretical framework in this study, linking both intra- and 
interorganizational dynamics involving CEOs and boards of 
directors. This study contributes to the literature on 
CEO-board relationships by showing how director experience 
on other boards can affect decision making (i.e., director 
selection and retention) on a given focal board. It contributes 
to the literature on interlocking directorates by proposing and 
testing a new perspective on the formation and dissolution 
of board interlock ties that differs from the 
interorganizational resource dependence and intraclass unity 
approaches described above. While we share the view of 
intraclass theorists that interlocks can serve to "guide 
managerial behavior, socialize new directors into [the 
capitalist class] culture, and socially control deviant behavior" 
(Palmer, 1983: 42), we suggest that interlocks serve these 
functions for distinct and competing subcultures within the 
larger class of business elites. Finally, it contributes to the 
literature on director reputation by suggesting that while a 
director's prior experience can affect subsequent board 
appointments, such appointments may reflect a political 
rather than an economic rationality, in which both active and 
passive board members can thrive in a labor market for 
directors that is segmented by orientation toward 
management. 
We test our perspective using longitudinal data taken from 
hundreds of large U.S. corporations over a recent seven-year 
period. Some research has suggested that this period 
coincides with the spread of increased board activism and 
shareholder orientation (Useem, 1992; Davis and Thompson, 
1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1995) and an attendant increase 
in conflict between management and shareholder interests. 
In this context, a director's reputation for activism or 
passivity, along with the relative power of CEOs and boards, 
should be particularly relevant in influencing director 
selection and retention and thus the dynamics of board 
interlock formation and dissolution during this period. 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL TIES AND 
INTRAORGANIZATIONAL POWER 
Although researchers have drawn on a variety of theoretical 
perspectives to explain the diffusion of organizational 
phenomena through interlock network ties, recent 
discussions have tended to emphasize the role of such ties 
in spreading knowledge and awareness about specific 
organizational changes. As articulated by Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman (1989: 456), network ties between 
boundary-spanning personnel, including board members, 
"act as a conduit to disseminate ideas and innovations." 
Empirical support for this argument has been found in 
studies investigating the likelihood of adopting poison pills 
(Davis, 1991), making specific kinds of corporate acquisitions 
(Haunschild, 1993), adopting the multidivisional form (Palmer, 
Jennings, and Zhou, 1993), or making campaign 
contributions to particular political candidates (Mizruchi, 
1992). 
On a deeper level, interlock ties may help spread more 
fundamental belief systems about corporate strategy, 
organizational structure, or the board's role in the 
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organization, providing the foundation for a variety of 
organizational changes. Empirical research investigating the 
development of group norms has shown how the prior 
experiences of individual group members in similar contexts 
can provide the foundation for norms of the focal group 
(Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985). Thus board members 
who have participated in various strategic or structural 
changes on other boards bring those beliefs and the various, 
more specific scripts associated with them to the focal 
board, ultimately "negotiating" or advocating changes in 
board norms consistent with their beliefs (Bettenhausen and 
Murnighan, 1985). While governance scholars have noted 
the potential role of socialization experiences in affecting 
board decision making (Alderfer, 1986), such processes are 
frequently assumed to operate only within the focal board. 
Given that a large portion of corporate directors hold multiple 
board seats, however, and have held other directorships in 
the past (Useem, 1984; Mizruchi, 1992), the collective 
influence of directors' experiences on other boards may 
frequently outweigh the effect of socialization experiences 
on the focal board. Thus directors who have participated in 
structural changes that increase board control over 
management may help spread increased board control to the 
other boards on which they sit, either by raising awareness 
about specific changes or by moving board norms toward a 
behavioral model that favors active monitoring and oversight 
on behalf of shareholders. In effect, by virtue of their prior 
experiences, such directors "come to a normative 
understanding" that the role of corporate director requires 
monitoring and controlling management decision making, 
prompting them to initiate and encourage changes 
consistent with such behavior where they serve as outside 
director (Burt, 1987: 1289; Ocasio, 1996). Conversely, 
directors who have participated in structural changes that 
protect or enhance the CEO's control over the board may 
come to believe that outside directors should defer to the 
CEO's judgment on strategic issues, leading them to help 
maintain board norms that favor director passivity and loyalty 
to the CEO. 
Director Experience and Change in Board Interlocks 
Given that directors' relative experience with increased 
board control at other companies can affect their willingness 
to abide CEO control at the focal firm, powerful CEOs may 
seek to sustain CEO control by (1) avoiding director 
candidates who have participated in greater board control 
over management and (2) selecting, instead, directors whose 
experience on other boards reflects board passivity toward 
management. Conversely, powerful boards can perpetuate 
or increase their control over management by (1) avoiding 
directors who have been socialized into a passive board role, 
as indicated by their participation in allowing greater CEO 
control on other boards and (2) appointing individuals with 
prior experience in asserting board control. Moreover, 
individual board members should prefer activist new 
directors because, as Alderfer (1986) suggested, boards 
require unanimity and a sense of common purpose to 
control management decision making effectively, just as all 
groups require unanimity and cohesion to manage actors in 
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Board Interlocks 
their environment (Gladstein, 1984). Through selection and 
retention, then, powerful actors in the CEO-board 
relationship can "manage" board interlocks so as to 
reinforce or increase their control. 
This argument is consistent more generally with the 
theoretical and empirical literature on power in organizations, 
which cites control over employee selection as an efficient 
means of building political coalitions (Pfeffer, 1981: 163; 
1992). Managers can often build or protect their power 
bases more easily and cheaply by hiring or promoting 
individuals likely to support their personal, political interests 
than by trading favors with existing colleagues (Pfeffer, 
1981). Drawing on this literature, several governance 
scholars have suggested that CEO control over the director 
selection process represents an important source of 
managerial entrenchment (Mace, 1971; Kosnik, 1987; 
Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin, 1988; Wade, O'Reilly, 
and Chandratat, 1990). For instance, Lorsch and Maclver 
(1989) and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989: 124) noted that 
CEOs can "coopt" the board by favoring the appointment of 
"sympathetic" new directors. Although this process has 
typically been associated with CEO behavior, Westphal and 
Zajac (1995: 78) suggested that this process also applies to 
boards seeking to increase their monitoring and control by 
appointing new directors who are sympathetic to the 
orientation of existing directors. In effect, we propose that 
directors' experiences on other boards may furnish a 
relatively direct indicator of their relative "sympathy" toward 
either management or shareholder interests, thus providing a 
basis for director selection and retention. 
An implication of this line of reasoning is that changes in 
relative control by the CEO or board may spread through the 
network of interlocking directorates in ways that have not 
been specified in prior research. We propose here that the 
diffusion of specific governance changes will depend on 
whether powerful actors in CEO-board relationships seek to 
deflect or encourage such diffusion. For example, the 
diffusion of a governance change that diminishes CEO 
control may be deflected by powerful CEOs by avoiding or 
eliminating interlock ties with prior "adopters." Similarly, 
powerful CEOs may also steer the diffusion of changes that 
protect or increase their control over the board by adding 
ties to prior adopters of such changes. As one director cited 
in Lorsch and Maclver (1989: 77) suggested, "The CEO 
shapes the board very much the way he wants, not only 
bringing people in, but also getting people he doesn't like off 
the board." Similarly, directors who sit on powerful boards 
are likely to prefer new director candidates who share their 
belief in active boards. As another director cited in Lorsch 
and Maclver (1989: 5) noted, "Directors today don't want 
colleagues like the old ones who rubber-stamped 
management's decisions." 
In this way, contests for intraorganizational power can affect 
interorganizational ties: The actions of powerful corporate 
leaders seeking to influence the selection and retention of 
board members generate a "segmented" interlock network 
(Kaufman, 1986), with relatively few ties between active and 
passive boards and relatively dense ties between boards 
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I 
For each of the hypotheses developed 
below, the two components of the 
hypothesis are related but distinct, such 
that a director can experience a change 
in appointments at low-control boards but 
not experience any change in 
appointments at high-control boards. 
with similar power structures. Here, we examine the 
dynamic process by which this segmentation is maintained. 
We propose that a director's prior experiences on boards 
that have made changes that increase or decrease board 
control over management provide a strong indication of that 
director's likely subsequent behavior on other boards, 
affecting the relative attractiveness of that director in the 
following ways: 
Proposition la: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
moved to increase board control over management will have (1) 
fewer subsequent appointments to boards having low control and 
(2) more subsequent appointments to boards having high control. 
Proposition lb: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
moved to decrease board control over management will have (1) 
more subsequent appointments to boards having low control and 
(2) fewer subsequent appointments to boards having high control. 
In the remainder of this section, we develop specific 
testable hypotheses corresponding to the propositions 
offered above. While it is difficult to observe and measure 
directly the level of board control over management in large 
corporations, a number of indicators have been used in prior 
governance research to capture such differences across 
organizations. We consider five different indicators in this 
study: changes in the ratio of outside to inside directors, in 
board leadership structure, in diversification, in total 
compensation, and in compensation contingency. The first 
two are measures of board structure that assess board 
control over management, and the latter three are measures 
of strategy or policy that reflect attention to shareholder 
interests or managerial interests. Given that all five variables 
are visible to top managers and directors at other 
companies, they can provide a more salient basis for new 
director selection than less visible measures of actual board 
decision-making processes. 
Change in the outsider ratio. Perhaps the most commonly 
used indicator of board independence from management is 
the ratio of outside to total directors. Governance 
researchers and champions of board reform have long 
contended that nonemployee or "outside" directors are 
better positioned to control management decision making 
than insiders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As subordinates to 
the CEO, inside directors may be reluctant to challenge or 
question the-CEO's position on an issue in.board meetings, 
even when shareholder interests appear to be threatened 
(Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin, 1988; Hoskisson, 
Johnson, and Moesel, 1994). Outsiders should also be better 
able than insiders to judge managerial performance 
impartially, raising the likelihood that a poorly performing 
CEO will be dismissed (Boeker, 1992). Thus, increases in the 
ratio of outside to inside directors can be considered 
indicative of increased board control over management, 
while decreases in this measure should indicate greater 
board passivity in monitoring management decision making:' 
Hypothesis la: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
increased the ratio of outside to inside directors will have fewer 
subsequent appointments to boards having low control and more 
subsequent appointments to boards having high control. 
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Hypothesis lb: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
decreased the ratio of outside to inside directors will have more 
subsequent appointments to boards having low control and fewer 
subsequent appointments to boards having high control. 
Change in board leadership structure. It is also commonly 
suggested by organizational scholars and members of the 
business press that separating the CEO and board chair 
positions (i.e., allocating each position to separate 
individuals) should greatly increase the board's capacity to 
control management decision making (Vance, 1983; 
Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988; Crystal, 1991; Beatty 
and Zajac, 1994; Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). Given that 
the board chair is nominally responsible for evaluating CEO 
decisions, allocating both roles to the same individual 
presents a conflict of interest (Kesner and Johnson, 1990; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Moreover, board meetings 
represent the primary forum for directors to challenge CEOs' 
proposals (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). By dictating an 
agenda that offers a limited opportunity for open debate, a 
CEO serving as board chair can easily minimize the level of 
board monitoring behavior (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). 
Conversely, an independent chairperson is better able to 
control management on behalf of shareholders. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
separated the CEO and board chair positions will have fewer 
subsequent appointments to boards having low control and more 
subsequent appointments to boards having high control. 
Hypothesis 2b: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
combined the CEO and board chair positions will have more 
subsequent appointments to boards having low control and fewer 
subsequent appointments to boards having high control. 
Change in corporate diversification. According to 
managerialist and agency researchers, top managers have 
personal incentives to pursue diversification beyond the level 
at which shareholder wealth is maximized (Hill and Snell, 
1988; Jensen, 1988; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). From 
the managerialist perspective, top managers may diversify 
into largely unrelated businesses to increase their personal 
power, compensation, and status (Marris, 1964). Agency 
theorists emphasize the link between diversification and 
reducing managerial risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981). By 
diversifying into unrelated businesses, managers can 
stabilize their investment portfolios while also reducing their 
employment risk. Shareholders should favor lower levels of 
diversification, because they can diversify their investment 
portfolios more easily than CEOs can diversify their 
employment. Thus, as nominal representatives of 
shareholder interests, relatively powerful boards of directors 
should resist managerial preferences for excessive corporate 
diversification (Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1994). 
Conversely, as Jensen (1988) has suggested, board passivity 
may be partly responsible for inefficient diversification levels. 
Therefore, reduced corporate diversification provides an 
indication of greater shareholder representation and lower 
managerial control over board monitoring activity. 
Participation on boards that have overseen reduced 
corporate diversification would send a negative signal in the 
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This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 20:57:09 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
market for directors at CEO-dominated boards and a positive 
signal at companies with more active boards: 
Hypothesis 3a: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
decreased corporate diversification will have fewer subsequent 
appointments to boards having low control and more subsequent 
appointments to boards having high control. 
Hypothesis 3b: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
increased corporate diversification will have more subsequent 
appointments to boards having low control and fewer subsequent 
appointments to boards having high control. 
Change in total compensation. The managerial and 
academic literatures on corporate governance have long 
attributed high levels of CEO compensation to board 
passivity and CEO entrenchment. Several studies have 
reported evidence that board independence from the top 
management is associated with smaller increases in CEO 
compensation (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Main, 
O'Reilly, and Wade, 1995; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
Changes in CEO compensation at large companies are well 
publicized and highly visible to managers and directors at 
other boards and thus may provide a salient indicator of the 
relative independence of the board from management. 
Participation on boards that have reduced the level of CEO 
compensation would therefore send a negative signal in the 
market for directors at CEO-dominated boards and a positive 
signal among companies with more active boards: 
Hypothesis 4a: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
decreased total compensation will have fewer subsequent 
appointments to boards having low control and more subsequent 
appointments to boards having high control. 
Hypothesis 4b: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
increased total compensation will have more subsequent 
appointments to boards having low control and fewer subsequent 
appointments to boards having high control. 
Change in compensation contingency. Contingent 
compensation contracts include a variety of different 
incentive plans that link management pay to firm 
performance, thus aligning the interests of CEOs with the 
preferences of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to agency theorists, long-term incentives such as 
stock options, performance shares, or restricted stock are a 
primary mechanism by which corporate boards protect 
shareholder interests against management excesses (Kerr 
and Kren, 1992; Gibbs, 1993; Beatty and Zajac, 1994), and 
both economic and behavioral iteratures on executive 
compensation suggest that, in general, CEOs should prefer 
less long-term incentive compensation in their pay packages. 
From a normative agency theory perspective, CEOs (as 
risk-averse agents) prefer less risk in their compensation 
contracts (Harris and Raviv, 1979). By making compensation 
contingent on future firm performance, long-term incentives 
add uncertainty to a CEO's compensation. Some empirical 
evidence suggests that passive boards make only limited 
use of long-term incentive compensation in designing CEO 
compensation contracts (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989), while 
increased board independence from management is typically 
followed by higher levels of contingent compensation 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Membership on boards that 
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have increased CEO compensation contingency should 
therefore decrease an individual's marketability among 
CEO-dominated boards, while increasing his or her 
attractiveness to relatively active boards: 
Hypothesis 5a: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
increased CEO compensation contingency will have fewer 
subsequent appointments to boards having low control and more 
subsequent appointments to boards having high control. 
Hypothesis 5b: Directors who sit on boards that have recently 
decreased CEO compensation contingency will have more 
subsequent appointments to boards having low control and fewer 
subsequent appointments to boards having high control. 
METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
The population for this study included top managers of the 
largest U.S. industrial and service firms, as listed in the 1986 
Forbes and Fortune 500 indexes. We restricted our attention 
in this study to directors who were also CEOs, because 
recent evidence shows that CEO-directors play a pivotal role 
(relative to other directors) in determining the extent to 
which a board develops a passive or active orientation 
(Lorsch and Maclver, 1989: 18; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). 
The Forbes 500 uses multiple lists whose overlap depends 
on the specific size measure used; we included top 
managers of those firms that qualified according to two or 
more size measures. Directors were excluded from the final 
sample if complete diversification and compensation data 
were unavailable. This procedure yielded a final sample of 
491 directors. T-tests revealed no significant differences 
between this sample and the larger population across any of 
the director, board, or firm attributes for which data were 
available on the larger population (i.e., director age, 
compensation level, board composition or leadership 
structure at the director's home company, or profitability or 
size-measured as log of sales-of the director's home 
company). 
Data were collected for the years 1985 to 1992, inclusive. 
We obtained data on interlock ties, board structure, and CEO 
and outside director characteristics from the Dun and 
Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Management, 
Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and 
Executives, and Who's Who in Finance and Industry; 
compensation data came from proxy statements. Finally, we 
obtained diversification data from Standard & Poor's 
COMPUSTAT Business Segment Tapes and Compact 
Disclosure; size and performance data were provided by 
COMPUSTAT and the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). 
Independent Variables 
We measured participation in increased board control across 
five different indicators. For each indicator, we first 
calculated the measure for each board in the sample in each 
year and then created measures of participation in increased 
board control for each year by comparing-for all boards on 
which the focal individual sits-the value of the given 
measure in year t with the value in year t - 1. Thus, for 
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example, we first measured the outsider ratio in each year 
as the number of nonemployee directors divided by the total 
number of board members. We then calculated participation 
in increased outsider ratio as the number of boards on which 
the focal individual sits that increased the ratio of outside to 
inside directors from year t - 1 to year t. Board leadership 
structure was measured dichotomously, coded as 1 if the 
CEO and board chair positions are separate in a given year, 
and 0 otherwise. To measure participation in CEO/board 
chair separation, we calculated the number of boards on 
which the focal individual sits with combined CEO-board 
chair position in year t - 1 and separated CEO-board chair 
positions in year t. 
In some cases, as in the outsider ratio, it was also possible to 
measure participation in increased board control as the 
average change across all boards on which the individual 
serves as director. We chose to treat each change as a 
dichotomous event for theoretical and empirical reasons. 
Theoretically, for most of the five measures, any change 
should represent a distinctive and visible event to managers 
and directors on other boards (exceptions are discussed 
further below). Empirically, the size of change is very 
restricted for several of our independent variables, e.g., 
boards rarely increase the outsider ratio by adding more than 
two individuals to the board, so that the magnitude of such 
increases is very similar across cases (Mizruchi and Stearns, 
1988). Thus the count variables based on dichotomous 
change measures would be highly correlated with variables 
indicating the average, continuous change. Nevertheless, to 
ensure that our results did not hinge on one particular 
specification, we also conducted a separate analysis 
measuring participation as the average change in the 
relevant measure across all boards on which the individual 
serves as director (i.e., for those changes that can be 
measured continuously). The results were very similar to 
those reported below, suggesting that our findings do not 
depend on one particular specification of the independent 
variables. 
To measure participation in reduced diversification, we used 
Palepu's (1985) entropy measure. This measure takes into 
account the number of segments in which a firm operates 
and weights each segment according to its contribution to 
total sales. It is defined as follows: 
n 
Pi * ln(1I/P), 
where P is the sales (dollar value) attributed to segment i 
and In(1/Pj) is the weight for each segment i, or the 
logarithm of the inverse of its sales. We calculated reduced 
diversification as a decrease in the entropy measure 
exceeding one standard deviation, to capture relatively 
significant change and exclude change that reflects random 
alterations in segment sales levels (Amit and Livnat, 1988). 
The results were substantively similar using alternative 
thresholds, such as a decrease of one-half of one standard 
deviation. The standard deviation is based on change in 
diversification from year t - 1 to year t. Participation in 
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reduced diversification was then measured as the number of 
firms where the focal individual serves as director that 
decreased diversification from the prior year to the current 
year. 
To assess participation in increased compensation 
contingency, we first calculated contingency for each year as 
the total value of long-term incentive grants divided by total 
direct compensation. Short-term bonuses were not included 
in this measure because they are notoriously susceptible to 
manipulation (Healy, 1985), but stock options were included. 
Although it is possible for companies to "swap" 
higher-priced options for lower-priced options, thus diluting 
their incentive effect, this practice is extremely rare. We 
valued stock options using the Black-Scholes (1973) method, 
which estimates option value based on the historical price 
volatility of the underlying security. Other grants (e.g., 
restricted stock, performance shares, etc.) were valued 
according to the market price at date of grant (Crystal, 1984). 
All compensation values were adjusted for inflation to 
represent 1990 constant dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index. This approach to measuring compensation 
contingency is commonly used by compensation consultants 
(e.g., Crystal, 1984; Ellig, 1984). 
By contrast, the simple correlation between CEO pay and 
firm performance is a very problematic measure of 
compensation contingency. The most serious problem is 
how to treat long-term incentives in such a measure. The 
value of long-term incentive grants (e.g., stock options, 
which confer the right to buy shares of common stock in the 
future) depends on future performance, while salary, bonus, 
and other forms of compensation depend on prior 
performance. Thus total compensation could not be 
correlated with performance over a single period. 
Researchers have sometimes attempted to avoid this 
problem by excluding long-term incentives from their 
measures of compensation. This approach is problematic in 
assessing the correlation between pay and performance, 
however, because long-term incentive compensation is the 
primary mechanism that companies use to make pay 
contingent on performance (cf., Ellig, 1984; Tosi and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Kerr and Kren, 1992; Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995; Seward and Walsh, 1996). 
We calculated participation in greater CEO compensation 
contingency as the number of firms where the focal 
individual serves as director that increased compensation 
contingency from the prior year to the current year. 
Participation in reduced total CEO compensation was 
calculated as the number of firms where the focal individual 
serves as director that reduced CEO total direct 
compensation from the prior year to the current year. 
Finally, we created five parallel independent measures 
gauging participation in reduced board independence: 
participation in decreased outsider ratio; participation in 
CEO/board chair combination; participation in increased 
diversification; participation in reduced compensation 
contingency; and participation in increased total 
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compensation. Increased total compensation does not 
exactly parallel decreased total compensation. Rather, we 
measured it as a positive change in the CEO's total direct 
compensation exceeding one standard deviation. This 
enables us to capture relatively distinctive and noticeable 
changes, since a large portion of companies in the sample 
increased total compensation in any given year. As with the 
diversification variables, the results were robust to 
alternative change thresholds, such as a positive change of 
one-half of one standard deviation. 
Several control variables were included in the analyses. First, 
an individual's reputation or attractiveness in the director 
labor market may depend on the performance of companies 
where he or she has served as director (Fama, 1980). 
Accordingly, we included a control variable indicating the 
average profitability of firms at which the focal individual 
served as outside director in the prior year. We measured 
profitability as return on assets, industry-adjusted at the 
two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code level. 
From a human capital perspective (Becker, 1975), top 
managers' compensation at their home company may also 
indicate their worth as a corporate leader and, by extension, 
their value as an outside director. Alternatively, the level of a 
top manager's compensation could be viewed as reflecting 
the degree of board control at that individual's home 
company, thus providing another indicator of the individual's 
personal experience with greater or lesser board control. 
Thus we included the director's total direct compensation 
(total compensation) as CEO in his or her home company as 
a control variable in all models. This measure includes salary, 
short-term bonus, and the total value of long-term incentive 
grants. 
Furthermore, because an individual's age might be taken as 
an indication of his or her likely openness to new ideas 
about board independence and control, we also controlled 
for age in all models. In addition, the total number of board 
appointments held by an individual could affect subsequent 
appointments in several ways. The total number of 
appointments a person holds might independently affect his 
or her prestige in the director labor market (Davis, 1993), but 
workload limitations may prompt CEOs with many 
appointments to decline further invitations. Accordingly, we 
controlled for the total number of directorships held in the 
prior year (number of prior appointments). Finally, we also 
controlled for director participation in CEO succession events 
(participation in succession) on other boards. Although 
Boeker (1992) suggested that succession is less indicative of 
board control than outright dismissal, which is more difficult 
for individuals outside the organization to detect, 
participation in succession may be related to some of the 
other indicators of board control used in this study (Harrison, 
Torres, and Kukulis, 1988) and thus is included as a control 
variable in all models. This variable is defined as the number 
of firms at which the focal individual serves as director that 
experienced CEO succession within the prior year. 
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Dependent Variables 
Analyzing change in appointments to boards with high or low 
control over management required defining and identifying 
high- and low-control boards. We addressed this by 
developing an overall measure capturing the extent to which 
a firm's board displays a relatively enduring orientation 
toward board control (high control) or board passivity (low 
control). We began by standardizing the five indicators of 
board control discussed above and summing these five 
measures together for each board in the sample. This 
measure was calculated as the average value over a moving 
three-year period (i.e., year t - 2 to year t) to avoid 
measurement error that would otherwise arise from 
temporary fluctuations in relative control. We then 
distinguished between high- and low-control boards by 
taking the median split for this measure, separately for each 
year. Using this information, we constructed two dependent 
measures: Additions/subtractions in appointments to boards 
with low control over management and Additions! 
subtractions in appointments to boards with high control 
over management. 
We developed separate measures for additions and 
subtractions in appointments to examine the robustness of 
our results in predicting losses, as well as gains, in 
subsequent appointments and thus were able to assess 
director selection and retention, respectively. In creating 
these variables, we first calculated an overall change 
measure in each year as the number of appointments to 
boards with low or high control in year t + 2 minus the 
number of appointments to boards with low or high control 
in year t. We measured change in board appointments over 
a multiyear interval because employment contracts for 
directors limit the number of openings that are available in 
any given year. From the two overall change measures we 
then created four count variables indicating the net increase 
or decrease in appointments to low- or high-control boards 
over the two-year period. Table 1 provides the means, 
standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all data 
pooled. 
Analysis 
We used poisson regression analysis to assess change in 
board appointments (Maddala, 1983). This technique is 
suitable for estimating models predicting the number of 
discrete occurrences (i.e., counts) of some event, in this 
case, additions or subtractions in board appointments. 
Separate models were created to analyze change in 
appointments to boards with high control or low control over 
management. The individual models analyze the effect that a 
board member's prior participation (from year t - 1 to year 
t) in each of the five governance-related changes in board 
structure and strategy or policy decisions has on subsequent 
additions or subtractions (from year t to year t + 2) in 
appointments to boards with high- or low-control 
orientations. All control variables were lagged by one year. 
We observed relationships over five time periods, yielding 
2,455 CEO-years of data. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Variables Mean S.D. la lb ic id 
1. Participation in: 
a. Increased outsider ratio .308 .550 
b. CEO/board chair separation .206 .449 .15 
c. Reduced diversification .176 .435 .06 .09 
d. Greater compensation contingency .439 .611 .19 .16 .05 
e. Reduced total compensation .173 .422 .21 .27 .19 .28 
2. Participation in: 
a. Decreased outsider ratio .173 .454 - .22 - .18 - .19 - .13 
b. CEO/board chair combination .100 .352 - .23 - .16 - .06 - .08 
c. Increased diversification .137 .413 - .09 - .12 - .18 - .06 
d. Reduced compensation contingency .092 .332 -.20 -.17 -.19 -.20 
e. Greater total compensation .091 .321 - .14 - .15 - .05 - .26 
3. Average return on assets .001 .059 -.09 .15 .06 .07 
4. Total compensation (in millions) 1.875 2.218 -.1 1 -.17 -.08 -.13 
5. Age 58.519 5.680 -.18 -.05 -.12 -.10 
6. Number of prior appointments 4.388 3.212 .08 .11 .12 .07 
7. Change in appointments to boards with high control 
a. Subtractions .746 .767 -.15 -.27 -.23 -.16 
b. Additions 1.094 .940 .14 .21 .25 .26 
8. Change in appointments to boards with low control 
a. Subtractions .873 .777 .27 .32 .18 .21 
b. Additions .944 .947 -.25 -.26 -.15 -.23 
We also conducted a series of separate analyses using two 
other models: a generalized least squares (GLS) model and a 
negative binomial model. The results were substantively 
consistent with the results of poisson regression analysis 
reported below (i.e., the tests of statistical significance 
supported the same set of hypotheses). 
RESULTS 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of poisson regression 
analysis of change in board appointments. The models in 
Table 2 predict change in appointments to boards with low 
control over management, while the models in Table 3 
predict change in appointments to boards with high board 
control. As noted earlier, we provide two models in each 
table to reflect the fact that while our hypotheses apply to 
change in appointments, we can analyze such changes 
separately in terms of additions or subtractions to further 
assess the robustness of the findings. Hypothesis la, for 
example, predicted that participation in increasing the 
proportion of outside directors would lead to a decrease in 
appointments to-boards with low control over management 
and an increase in appointments to boards with high control 
over management. The findings, as shown in Table 2, 
support this hypothesis: Participating in increasing the 
outsider ratio is negatively related to subsequent 
appointments to boards with low control over management. 
This holds true both in terms of fewer additions to new 
boards and more subtractions from current boards. The 
expected converse pattern of results emerged in models 
predicting appointments to boards with high control over 
management. The results in Table 3 show that participation 
in increasing the outsider ratio is positively associated with 
subsequent appointments to boards with high control over 
management (both in terms of more additions and fewer 
subtractions). 
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Table 1 (continued) 
le 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 3 4 5 6 7a 7b 8a 
- .30 
-.11 .17 
.01 .11 .13 
- .25 .27 .36 .20 
-.33 .09 .21 .19 .34 
-.12 -.08 -.08 .06 .09 -.12 
-.19 .02 .09 .11 .09 .21 .08 
-.14 .10 .15 .09 .10 .08 .07 -.03 
.05 .14 .06 .14 .10 .09 -.01 .07 .19 
-.07 .24 .29 .05 .22 .11 -.15 .16 .20 -.13 
.08 -.26 -.32 -.04 -.23 -.15 .13 -.09 -.19 .10 -.34 
.22 -.16 -.31 -.07 -.17 -.08 .06 -.20 -.17 -.10 -.38 .21 
-.18 .18 .32 .08 .15 .11 -.05 .18 .12 .14 .33 -.25 -.37 
Table 2 
Poisson Regression Models of Change in Appointments to Boards with Low Control over Management 
(N = 2455)* 
Change in Appointments 
Independent Variables Subtractions Additions 
1. Participation in: 
a. Increased outsider ratio .408 (.100)--- -.344 (.1 18)-- 
b. CEO/board chair separation .531 (.157)--- -.417 (.174)-- 
c. Reduced diversification .312 (.138)- - .374 (.163)- 
d. Greater compensation contingency .270 (.102)-- -.408 (.151)- 
e. Reduced total compensation .389 (.162)-- - .450 (.226)- 
2. Participation in: 
a. Decreased outsider ratio -.170 (.086)- .206 (.072)-- 
b. CEO/board chair combination - .594 (.135)--- .393 (.142)--- 
c. Increased diversification -.077 (.097) .040 (.089) 
d. Reduced compensation contingency -.227 (.095)-- .208 (.081)-- 
e. Greater total compensation -.256 (.140) .280 (.154) 
3. Average return on assets .572 (.594) - .524 (.612) 
4. Total compensation -.00002 (.00001)- .00003 (.00001)-- 
5. Age - .015 (.007)- .010 (.005)- 
6. Number of prior appointments -.021 (.017) .016 (.014) 
7. Participation in succession .195 (.389) -.169 (.163)-- 
Constant .273 (.175) .755 (.312)-- 
Chi square 465.69--- 488.18--- 
p < .05; *p < .01; "-p < .001; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
* Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Hypothesis 1 b predicted opposite consequences from 
participating in decreasing outsider ratios as an outside 
director. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results indicate 
that experience with decreasing the outsider ratio is 
positively associated with subsequent appointments to 
low-control boards (more additions and fewer subtractions) 
and negatively associated with subsequent appointments to 
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high-control boards (fewer additions and more subtractions). 
Taken together, the tests of hypotheses 1a and 1 b are quite 
robust in suggesting that a director's prior experiences with 
a governance change involving altering the outsider ratio can 
result in predictable changes in subsequent appointments. 
Table 3 
Poisson Regression Models of Change in Appointments to Boards with High Control over Management 
(N = 2455)* 
Change in Appointments 
Independent Variables Subtractions Additions 
1. Participation in: 
a. Increased outsider ratio -.237 (.11 1)- .214 (.106)- 
b. CEO/board chair separation -.527 (.157)--- .363 (.174)- 
c. Reduced diversification -.370 (.139)-- .284 (.1 10)-- 
d. Greater compensation contingency - .291 (.149)- .425 (.1 12)- 
e. Reduced total compensation -.179 (.171) .329 (.211) 
2. Participation in: 
a. Decreased outsider ratio .478 (.073)--- -.330 (.106)--- 
b. CEO/board chair combination .329 (.082)--- - .641 (.137)--- 
c. Increased diversification .043 (.094) - .035 (.113) 
d. Reduced compensation contingency .226 (.093)-- -.362 (.135)-- 
e. Greater total compensation .203 (.182) - .430 (.187)- 
3. Average return on assets -1.148 (.581) 1.169 (.621) 
4. Total compensation .00002 (.00001)- -.00002 (.00001)- 
5. Age .012 (.006)- - .016 (.007)- 
6. Number of prior appointments - .023 (.019) .019 (.017) 
7. Participation in succession - .213 (.123) .144 (.110) 
Constant .280 (.341) .643 (.421) 
Chi square 297.04--- 334.57000 
* p ? .05; sep < .01; *--p < .001; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
* Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
A similar pattern of results emerged in support of 
hypotheses 2a and 2b. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, 
participation in separating the CEO and board chair positions 
is negatively associated with additional appointments to 
boards with low control over management and positively 
associated with subsequent subtractions, while for 
high-control boards, such experience is positively associated 
with subsequent additions and negatively associated with 
subsequent subtractions. Moreover, experience in combining 
the CEO and board chair positions is associated with fewer 
subsequent appointments to high-control boards (fewer 
additions and more subtractions) and more subsequent 
appointments to low-control boards (more additions and 
fewer subtractions). 
Hypotheses 3-5 addressed the consequences of 
participating in additional strategy and policy changes that 
reflect greater (or lesser) board control over management. 
The findings generally support these hypotheses. For 
example, consistent with hypothesis 3a, participation in 
decreasing corporate diversification leads to fewer 
subsequent appointments to boards with low control over 
management (i.e., fewer additions and more subtractions) 
and also leads to more subsequent appointments to boards 
with high control (i.e., more additions and fewer 
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subtractions). The results of testing hypothesis 3b, however, 
show that participation in increasing corporate diversification 
is not significantly related to subsequent change in board 
appointments to either high-control boards or low-control 
boards. 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b, which addressed the effects on 
subsequent board appointments of a director's prior 
participation in increasing or decreasing total CEO 
compensation are generally supported. As hypothesis 4a 
argued, a director's prior participation in decreasing total 
CEO compensation is negatively associated with subsequent 
appointments to boards with low control over management 
(both in terms of fewer additions and more subtractions) and 
also is positively associated (p < .10) with subsequent 
appointments at high-control boards (but only in terms of 
additions). Hypothesis 4a is partially supported: Participation 
in increasing total CEO compensation is positively associated 
with subsequent appointments to low-control boards (more 
additions and fewer subtractions) and negatively associated 
with subsequent appointments to high-control boards (but 
only for additions). 
The results strongly support hypotheses 5a and 5b. 
Experience with increasing CEO compensation contingency 
is negatively associated with subsequent appointments to 
boards with low control (fewer additions and more 
subtractions) and positively associated with appointments to 
high-control boards (more additions and fewer subtractions). 
Conversely, experience with decreased compensation 
contingency has the opposite effect. In general, therefore, 
the findings appear to provide robust evidence that 
participation in specific changes in board structure, corporate 
strategy, and CEO compensation that reflect change in 
relative control of CEOs and boards can differentially 
influence subsequent appointments to boards with high or 
low control over management. 
The control variables yielded several interesting results. The 
average profitability (return on assets) of firms at which the 
focal individual served as outside director in the prior year is 
not related to subsequent change in appointments to boards 
with low control over management. Average profitability 
does increase appointments to high-control boards, however 
(significant at alpha = .10). The director's total 
compensation as CEO in his or her home company is 
positively related to appointments at low-control boards and 
negatively related to appointments at high-control boards. 
Moreover, older directors gain more subsequent 
appointments at low-control boards and fewer subsequent 
appointments to high-control boards. 
We also examined the possibility that industry differences 
might affect our results. In separate analyses, we regressed 
the changes in board structure and CEO compensation on 
industry, designated as the company's two-digit SIC code. 
The industry factors did not significantly predict increased 
board control over management for any of the measures of 
board control; t-statistics ranged from .810 to 1.289. Thus it 
appears that our results are not driven by any tendency for 
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boards to choose directors from related industries (e.g., to 
alleviate resource dependencies). 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, the findings of this study strongly support our notion 
that internal organizational politics in the CEO-board 
relationship can significantly affect the selection and 
retention of directors and, more generally, the formation and 
dissolution of board interlocks. The first set of results 
showed how a director's prior participation on boards 
engaging in specific changes in board structure and strategy 
or policy that reflect greater board control can affect 
subsequent change in board appointments. In general, prior 
experience with changes indicating increased board control 
over top management enhanced an individual director's 
attractiveness at companies with relatively high board control 
while decreasing his or her attractiveness at companies with 
relatively passive boards. This result was robust over five 
different indicators of increased board control: increases in 
the ratio of outside to inside directors, separation of the CEO 
and board chair positions, reduced corporate diversification, 
increased CEO compensation contingency, and decreased 
total CEO compensation. The results were also quite robust 
in terms of the type of change (i.e., additions and 
subtractions) in board appointments. 
A second set of results showed the effect on subsequent 
board appointments of a director's prior participation in 
specific governance-related changes in the opposite 
direction, i.e., indicating greater CEO control over 
management. Overall, prior experience with such changes 
reduced a director's attractiveness to firms with relatively 
high board control while increasing his or her attractiveness 
to firms with more powerful CEOs and weak boards. Again, 
these results held for multiple indicators and for additions 
and subtractions in subsequent appointments. Taken 
together, these two sets of results provide strong evidence 
that prior experience with increased or decreased board 
control over management provides an important basis for 
selecting or retaining directors. 
The control variables used in this study provide additional 
support for a sociopolitical perspective on director selection 
and board composition. For example, director age is also 
positively associated with subsequent appointments to 
low-control boards and negatively associated with 
appointments to high-control boards. Older directors may be 
perceived in the market for corporate directors as being 
more accepting of board passivity in controlling management 
and less likely to embrace newer perspectives reflecting 
more active board involvement and control in management 
decision making. Moreover, directors' own total executive 
compensation at their home company is positively related to 
subsequent appointments at companies with low board 
control and negatively related to appointments at companies 
with high board control. This suggests that highly paid CEOs 
may be perceived as individuals who are accustomed to 
weak board control, which would increase their 
attractiveness at low board-control companies and decrease 
their attractiveness at high board-control companies. 
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Finally, the results show that the profitability at companies 
on whose boards the focal director sits is unrelated to 
subsequent change in appointments at companies with low 
board control but is positively related to change in 
appointments to high-control boards. Thus it appears that an 
individual's attractiveness in the market for directors may be 
increased by sitting on boards of highly performing 
companies, as some financial economists have suggested 
(Fama, 1980), but this attractiveness applies only within the 
subsegment of boards with relatively high control over 
management. Our political perspective shares the 
economists' interest in the reputation of corporate directors, 
i.e., how prior director experience can provide a signal to 
other interested parties, but our theoretical framework is 
more nuanced. It suggests that reputational effects may be 
more complex than previously assumed. The market for 
corporate directors is not driven by a simple "ex post 
settling up" process in which "high-quality" (active and 
shareholder-oriented) directors are rewarded and 
"low-quality" (passive and management-oriented) directors 
are punished (e.g., Fama, 1980). Our results suggest, 
instead, that the market for directors in U.S. corporations 
can reward either type of director, and our theoretical 
perspective identifies the mechanisms than can generate 
and sustain such a segmented market for corporate 
directors. 
This study contributes to research on corporate boards of 
directors by synthesizing three largely nonoverlapping 
theoretical literatures pertaining to board behavior: the 
economic literature on director reputation, the sociological 
literature on board interlocks, and the behavioral literature on 
CEO-board relationships. The findings show how powerful 
actors in CEO-board relationships can manage the content of 
board interlocks to maintain or increase their 
intraorganizational power. In this way, powerful CEOs can 
effectively exclude individuals who might import norms of 
active board monitoring and shareholder representation (i.e., 
at the expense of managerial preferences), while including 
individuals who have been socialized into a passive board 
role (Burt, 1987). In effect, our findings suggest that 
directors' experience on other boards may serve as a 
relatively direct reputational indicator of their "sympathy" 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989: 124) toward management 
or shareholder interests, thus providing a primary basis for 
director selection and retention. Moreover, this interpretation 
is consistent with the broader literature on power in 
organizations, which emphasizes control over employee 
selection and retention as an efficient means of building and 
maintaining political coalitions (Pfeffer, 1981). 
The findings also have implications for theory and research 
on the formation of board interlocks. While theorists have 
typically emphasized the role of interorganizational 
dependencies or classwide interests in determining interlock 
ties (Useem, 1982; Palmer, 1983; Mizruchi and Stearns, 
1988), the results of this study suggest that parochial 
political interests within the firm may also be an important 
determinant of interlock structure. In seeking to maintain or 
increase their influence in CEO-board relationships, powerful 
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corporate leaders help maintain a "segmented" interlock 
network with relatively few ties between active and passive 
boards and relatively dense ties between boards with similar 
power structures. For example, 82 percent of the total 
number of ties observed are within-group ties, while only 18 
percent are between-group ties. Thus, while our results 
could be viewed as consistent with the notion that interlock 
ties help elites to "close ranks" in the face of "deviant" 
behavior (Palmer, 1983: 42), interlocks appear to serve this 
function for competing subcultures within the broader class 
of corporate elites. The "rise of shareholder power" 
documented by Useem (1992: 19), Davis and Thompson 
(1994), and others (e.g., Zajac and Westphal, 1995) appears 
to have engendered a managerialist response that has 
affected the dynamic structure of board interlocks. 
Our findings indicate that while organizational practices may 
spread through the network of interlocking directorates, 
powerful actors in CEO-board relationships can block or 
redirect the diffusion of those changes that diminish their 
control by cutting off interlock ties to other adopters of 
those practices and steering the diffusion of changes that 
protect or increase their control over the focal board by 
adding ties to prior adopters. The theoretical perspective and 
empirical findings of this study may generalize to the 
diffusion of other organizational phenomena by suggesting 
how intraorganizational political interests can influence the 
course of interorganizational diffusion. Thus, while the role of 
existing social network ties in facilitating the diffusion of 
various structural and strategic changes within an 
organizational field is well understood (cf., Davis, 1991; 
Haunschild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993), future 
research could consider further the endogeneity of such ties, 
i.e., how they are created or severed and how they may 
reflect and reinforce the parochial political interests of 
already-powerful organizational decision makers. 
Another question that merits additional research attention is 
the origin of CEO-board power relationships and how 
reversals in that relationship might occur. Beatty and Zajac 
(1994) noted, for example, that the small and young firms 
they studied (i.e., initial public offering firms) have 
compensation contracts and corporate governance 
mechanisms different from those found in large Fortune 500 
firms. Qualitative and quantitative historical approaches 
might provide additional insight into how and why such 
changes occur over time and the implications of such 
changes on shifting the relative power balance in the 
CEO-board relationship. 
We began our study by asking why increased board 
independence and control over top management may have 
spread to some organizations and not to others. We sought 
to answer this question by developing a cross-level theory of 
interlock tie creation and dissolution that explains the 
simultaneous coexistence and persistence of both 
board-controlled and CEO-controlled firms. Specifically, we 
showed how powerful CEOs and powerful board members 
seek directors whose prior director experiences (i.e., 
reputation) suggest a shared belief about board passivity or 
activity, respectively, and how this politically rational 
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"matching" and segmentation process of like-minded 
individuals can influence the dynamic formation and 
dissolution of corporate interlock ties. These dynamics help 
to explain the fractured diffusion of increased board 
independence across large U.S. corporations. More 
generally, the findings illustrate the promise of developing 
"meso-level" theoretical frameworks integrating 
micropolitical factors and macro-social factors to explain 
organizational behavior. While such "meso-level" 
frameworks may be more complex than frameworks that 
address only micro or macro factors, they may offer the 
greatest potential to account for the simultaneous existence 
of what appear to be contradictory or opposing organizational 
phenomena. 
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